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The Common Good in a Divided Society• 
David Hollenbach, S.J. 
This essay will address an issue that is one of the crucial intellectual 
and social challenges facing the United States today, namely how the revi-
talization of the common good in our divided society entails special oblig-
ations toward the urban poor. 
Over two millennia ago, Aristotle argued that the good of the com-
munity should set the direction for the lives of individuals, for it is a 
higher or more "divine" good than the particular goods of private 
persons. 2 This theme has been echoed throughout much of the later his-
tory of Christian reflection. For example, St. Thomas Aquinas argued that 
God's own self is the highest good we can attain, and that a right relation 
to God requires a commitment to the common good of our neighbors 
and of all creation. 3 For Christians, the pursuit of the common good fol-
lows from the Bible's double commandment to love God with all one's 
heart and to love one's neighbor as oneself. 
This centrality of the common good in Christian life was echoed by 
Ignatius Loyola in the 16th century. Ignatius wrote that all the decisions 
of the Jesuit order he was founding should be directed "according to what 
will seem expedient to the glory of God and the common good."4 This 
si_n_gle phrase sums up much that is central to Ignatius Loyola's religious 
v1s1on. 
1. The Common Good in Trouble 
This ancient theme in the Western and Christian intellectual tradi-
tions is in trouble today-serious trouble. John Rawls speaks for many 
moral and political philosophers when he says that the pluralism of the 
contemporary landscape makes it impossible to envision a social good on 
which all can agree. Rawls asserts that the Aristotelian, Thomistic and 
Ignatian vision of the common good "is no longer a political possibility 
for those who accept the constraints of liberty and toleration of democra-
tic institutions." 5 
This skepticism about the difficulties involved in conceiving of the 
common good is certainly not limited to academic ivory towers. 
Ordinary people today are increasingly aware that their neighbors have 
many ideas about what a good life is. The reality of pluralism impinges 
on people daily as they rub shoulders at their workplace with those who 
have different religious beliefs and cultural traditions, and whose race, 
ethnicity, or language is different from their own. Television brings into 
middle-class homes images of seemingly foreign worlds of gang conflict, 
drive-by shootings, and drug-use. It is difficult to see these many different 
kinds of people as neighbors at all. If it is hard to envision them as neigh-
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bors, it is not easy to imagine a life that is both shared with them and 
also a good life. 
More to the point, when groups of people are fundamentally diver-
gent in their culture, tradition, and way of life, they can appear as threats 
to each other. When fear of these threats sets the tone, interaction with 
people who are different is perceived as a danger to be avoided. When 
understood in such terms, interaction can seem more like a "common 
bad" than a good we share in common. Defense of one's turf becomes the 
first requirement of the good life. 
One does not have to look very hard to find deep divides separating 
different communities in the United States. The emergence of "cults" and 
even militias in the U.S. shows that some Americans believe that the tra-
ditional religious and social institutions of the country cannot be relied 
on to help them live good lives. In a different way, memories of slavery, 
lynchings, ethnic exclusion, and newly awakened awareness of historical 
patterns of abuse and discrimination lead some minority groups to the 
conclusion that traditional ways and institutions do not protect their 
well-being or give them a fair chance to live good lives. 
Some recent social-scientific investigations have concluded that this is 
leading to a "culture war" in the United States today, i.e. that a funda-
mental conflict of world views has developed in mainstream groups of the 
American middle class. If this is true, the consequences for the United 
States as a whole could be ominous. It raises "the prospect that the demo-
cratic stability that has kept the country together since the Civil War will 
no longer be attainable. "6 
For this reason the contention that the United States is not only plu-
ralistic but culturally at war with itself over a broad range of moral values 
calls for careful scrutiny. Sociologist Alan Wolfe believes that the facts do 
not support the culture-war hypothesis and he is relieved to be able to say 
so. Nevertheless, the data that lead Wolfe to this conclusion are not reas-
suring from the point of view of concern for the common good. Wolfe 
suggests that conflict is being avoided precisely by abandoning the pursuit 
of the common good. Wolfe's study, One Nation After All, finds something 
close to consensus on what is valued most highly by the middle-class in 
the United States today. It can be summed up in a single word: tolerance. 
The high value placed on tolerance is evident in middle-class attitudes 
toward religious belief. Most middle-class Americans seem to have added 
an eleventh commandment to the biblical decalogue: Thou shalt not 
judge thy neighbor. 7 Middle-class Americans have an almost absolute 
aversion to strife and conflict about religious beliefs. Such tolerance is 
also evident in attitudes on many other questions with important conse-
quences for the quality of public life. These include the structure of fam-
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ily life, gender roles, immigration, multiculturalism, and race. A notable 
exception is low levels of tolerance for homosexuality. Average Americans 
are too non-judgmental to get sucked into battles on such issues that 
might tear the country apart. 8 The basic stance resembles the principle 
underlying laissez-faire economics: you can do what you want so long as 
you let me do what I want. 9 
Wolfe calls this tolerant stance on a broad spectrum of issues "moral-
ity writ small." It is an ethic that aspires to "modest virtues" and "ordi-
nary duties," such as kindness and honesty rather than larger goals of 
social justice and social equality. These modest virtues are surely impor-
tant; a culture-war in the United States would be a very bad thing. The 
American Civil War has already shown this vividly, and the abominations 
in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda have confirmed it afresh. So 
Wolfe breathes a sigh of relief to find tolerance alive and well in the 
United States. 
But shortly after the appearance of his book, Wolfe confessed that his 
research left him somewhat depressed. For morality writ small lacks "a 
shared sense of national purpose." Americans have a distinct lack of 
enthusiasm for meeting the responsibilities of national citizenship. "They 
seemed to want the benefits of being American without the obligations of 
paying taxes or paying attention." They are also distinctly unenthusiastic 
about the international responsibilities that go along with being an 
American in the emerging global context. Wolfe conjectures that this nar-
rowness of vision is a by-product of the prosperity of the middle-class. In 
the comfortable world of the middle-class, morality writ small translates 
into "couch-potato politics," an unwillingness or inability to articulate 
common purposes and act to secure them. 10 In other words, middle-class 
Americans lack a vision of the common good, both in their approach to 
national life and in their understanding of the role of the United States 
internationally. Avoidance of conflict has its virtues to be sure, but there 
are major social and political questions today that call for more vision 
than tolerance can generate on its own. Let me illustrate this by focusing 
on the struggles of poor African-Americans in central cities. 
2. A Problem Tolerance Can't Handle: Poverty in Central Cities 
The reality of urban poverty illustrates the fact that tolerance, taken 
by itself, is not a sufficient resource for addressing the urgent problems 
confronting American public life today. The quality of life in American 
cities is marked by economic deprivation, unemployment, single parent-
hood, homelessness, and frightening drug-related violence. The populations 
of inner cores of many large American cities are heavily African-American 
and they are largely poor. I believe one of the most important factors 
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impeding an adequate response to this reality is the preeminence of the 
virtue of tolerance over commitment to the common good in the United 
States today. A case for this claim takes the following form. 
First, most middle-class Americans live in neighborhoods that isolate 
them from people of significantly different social-economic backgrounds. 
This isolation is due, on one level, to the apparently impersonal forces of 
the real estate market. These market dynamics, however, are sustained by 
zoning laws and other boundaries that are the result of political choice 
rather than geography. A challenge to these choices can arise only within 
a moral framework that expands the understanding of community beyond 
that of homogeneous groups of the like-minded or those who are similarly 
situated economically. Such a challenge will be dependent on the develop-
ment of an understanding of the common good that reaches beyond the 
boundaries of existing groups. 
Second, pursuit of community by middle-class Americans today takes 
forms that in fact deepen the crisis of the inner cities. Many Americans 
recognize today that they cannot go it alone in the face of the complexi-
ties of contemporary life. But Robert Bellah has argued that the quest for 
community among suburbanites often leads to the development of 
"lifestyle enclaves." People in such enclaves find and express their identi-
ties through linkages with other persons with "shared patterns of appear-
ance, consumption, or leisure activities .... " Their relationships are based 
on some feature of private rather than public life. They "do not act 
together politically" as citizens but as friends together in a kind of club. 11 
So they are not likely to translate their need for community into ways of 
thinking and acting that are capable of addressing issues such as the divi-
sions between core cities and suburbs. In fact the need for community, 
when expressed in lifestyle enclaves, can have exactly the opposite effect. 
It can lead to the construction of walls and moats, in the form of bigger 
and better malls and tougher zoning ordinances that are designed to 
strengthen the locks that protect the privileged from those who are different. 
Third, increased racial tolerance among white suburbanites is not a 
single key that will unlock the doors that keep the poor of the inner-city 
from sharing in the national well-being. Socio-economic class differences 
between suburb and inner city are more important in sustaining these 
boundaries than are negative racial attitudes and prejudices. Racial preju-
dice continues to be an operative force in American life to be sure. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the presence of racist attitudes has 
notably declined over recent decades. This change has not been accompanied 
by an improvement in the situation of blacks who live in the inner-city. 
African-Americans at the lower end of the economic spectrum continue to 
live in dire straits. Nearly 10 million African-Americans live in poverty. 
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This is close to 25 percent of the black population in the United States. 
Black families are more than three times more vulnerable to poverty than 
their white counterparts. Hardest hit are black children. 12 In other words, 
a large portion of blacks in the United States-those who have not made it 
into the middle-class-have not benefited from increased racial tolerance. 
So a credible case can be made that the disparity between the quality 
of life in suburbs and in core cities is based less on racial intolerance than 
on class differences, though race continues to play a subordinate role. 13 
The division between classes is of course a matter of incomes-money 
matters here as almost everywhere. But urban/suburban differences are 
also manifest in the quality of schools, rates of labor force participation 
and unemployment, levels of drug use, incidence of crime, and levels of 
single parenthood. So even if disadvantages based on race have declined, 
serious class-based disparities remain very real , and those who are on the 
bottom side of these disparities lack the basic conditions that make good 
lives attainable. 
If intolerance is not the principal cause of urban poverty today, toler-
ance is not the principal solution. Further efforts to overcome racial intol-
erance or prejudice are not by themselves going to heal the wounds of the 
inner city. Acceptance of racial differences within a commitment to our 
common humanity must surely be pursued in its own right. Nothing I 
have said should be taken to suggest otherwise. But the virtue of toler-
ance, by itself, is not now a sufficient moral resource for addressing the 
problems of the poor in America's core cities. Toleration alone will not 
overcome social isolation and the despair it engenders. Addressing these 
problems in a serious way will require concerted efforts to overcome these 
class barriers. These barriers are the result of economic inequalities that 
are deeply ingrained and institutionalized in the class structures of society, 
so more than an attitude of tolerance is needed. 
This means the dominant middle-class morality writ small, with its 
preference for the quiet virtues, is an inadequate cultural resource for 
addressing the plight of American cities. Tolerance implies that if people 
would just leave each other alone everyone would be better off. 14 This is 
not an adequate stance if we hope to address the isolation and despair of 
the inner city poor. Making "Thou shalt not judge" the first command-
ment of public life undercuts such efforts from the start. It prevents us 
from raising questions about how the well-being of individual people 
might be advanced by a moral vision of goods we must share in common 
if we are to have them at all. Such a common good is the good of being a 
country that is not marred by a division between privileged suburban 
enclaves and despairing inner city ghettos. In my judgment, and I hope 
yours, such divisions are bad (a "common bad" we all live with today) and 
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overcoming these divisions would be a good (a "common good" we could 
all share in together). If we are to move toward such a society we need to 
become willing to make judgments that distinguish between such bads 
and goods. A culture that makes the commandment "Thou shalt not 
judge" into a first principle will be unable to address such questions. We 
will only be ready to address the realities of urban poverty if we move 
beyond tolerance to the pursuit of the common good. 
3. A Community of Freedom 
The tradition of Catholic social thought, especially as it has devel-
oped over the past century, is positioned to make a significant contribu-
tion to the recognition of the importance of the common good in both 
small-scale and wider forms of community. Its understanding of the com-
mon good is based on the recognition that the dignity of human persons 
is achieved only in community with others. This understanding has bibli-
cal roots in the notion of covenant-the fact that God called Israel pre-
cisely as a people, not as individuals one at a time. It also has Greek roots 
in Aristotle's understanding that the human being is a social or political 
animal, whose good is essentially bound up with the good of the commu-
nity. These understandings of the person have direct implications for the 
way freedom is understood. Freedom's most important meaning is 
positive, the ability to shape one's life and environment in an active and 
creative way, rather than the negative state of privacy or being left alone 
by others. For the ancient Greeks, privacy was a state of deprivation, a 
fact echoed in the etymological link of privacy and privation. Similarly, 
the biblical understanding of freedom, portrayed in the account of the 
Exodus, is not simply freedom from constraint but freedom for participation 
in the shared life of a people. Liberation is from bondage into community. 15 
To be sure, freedom from oppression demands that persons' dignity and 
rights be protected from infringement by other people, by society, or by 
the state. Freedom in its most basic form is freedom from oppression. But 
freedom will be understood in a truncated way if its meaning is under-
stood only as the negative immunity that protects one from interference 
by others. Individualistic isolation is finally a prison, not a liberation. 
Pope John Paul II has stressed this social dimension of freedom in his 
frequent discussions of the moral basis of democracy. Catholicism, of 
course, has often been regarded with justifiable suspicion in discussions of 
democracy because of its history of opposition to democratic movements 
in earlier days. Since the Second Vatican Council, however, the Catholic 
church has become one of the strongest advocates and agents of democra-
tization visible on the global stage today. 16 In his role as advocate of 
democratic government, John Paul II has been critical of ideas of democ-
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racy based on individualism and on strictly negative understandings of 
freedom. His analysis echoes some of the founders of the American exper-
iment in its insistence that the success of democracy over the long haul is 
dependent on the virtues present in the citizenry and the link between the 
life of virtue and commitment to the common good. 
According to this way of thinking, the basis of democracy is not sim-
ply tolerance for decisions made solo by autonomous individuals. 
Participation in democratic life and the exercise of real freedom in society 
depend on the strength of the communal relationships that give persons a 
measure of real power to shape their environment, including their politi-
cal environment. Solitary individuals, especially solitary individuals moti-
vated solely by self-interest and the protection of their rights to privacy, 
will be incapable of democratic self-government. Democracy requires 
more than this. It requires the virtues of mutual cooperation, mutual 
responsibility, and what Aristotle called civic friendship. 17 In more con-
temporary terms, it requires a commitment to solidarity with the others 
who live in our region, our country, and our world. It sees the good of 
each person as linked with the good of these larger worlds. 
The scale and diversity of the world, however, tempts us to conclude 
that community is achievable only in private enclaves of the like-minded. 
Local, small-scale communities are very important, as the Catholic tradi-
tion's principle of subsidiarity stresses. But these must be complemented 
by a kind of solidarity that is more universal in scope. This wider solidar-
ity is essential if the pursuit of community is to avoid becoming a source 
of the kind of conflict underway in Kosovo and other parts of the world. 
Commitment to community with the like-minded must be complemented 
by positive engagement with those who are different. It means working to 
overcome the boundaries of class that separate us. 
Solidarity does not appear among the cardinal virtues of prudence, 
justice, temperance and fortitude that were central for the Greeks and 
Romans, nor among the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love enu-
merated by Christian thinkers in the past. Pope John Paul II, however, 
has recently proposed to add solidarity to these classic lists by calling soli-
darity a key virtue needed to address the problems of our world. He 
defined this virtue as "a firm and persevering determination to commit 
oneself to the common good." 18 
Such solidarity has both intellectual and social dimensions. What I 
propose to call intellectual solidarity is a spirit of willingness to take other 
persons and groups seriously enough to engage them in conversation and 
debate about how the interdependent world we share should be shaped 
and structured. Thus it calls for public discourse about diverse visions of 
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the good life. Such discourse is quite different from tolerance. Tolerance, 
as I use the term here, is a strategy of disengagement and of leaving each 
other alone. Disengagement from serious discourse about the life we must 
live together is precisely what we cannot afford if we wish to shape our 
interdependent existence in humanly worthy ways. In contrast with this, 
intellectual solidarity calls for engagement with the other through both 
listening and speaking, in the hope that understanding might replace 
incomprehension and that perhaps even agreement about the good we 
share in common could result. Short of full agreement, such engagement 
is already itself a major part of common good, for through it we become a 
community of active citizens rather than political couch potatoes. 
Because intellectual solidarity demands mutual listening and speaking, 
it can only occur where all are genuinely free to set forward their visions 
of the common good and the reasons why they hold it. But it also 
depends on people having something to say and being unafraid to say it. 
Aristotle maintained that the very existence of human society is depen-
dent on the human power of speech, the ability of citizens to set forth 
publicly their understandings of "the expedient and the inexpedient," "the 
just and the unjust. " These understandings are rooted in a "sense of good 
and evil" which only human beings possess. 19 Thus to avoid serious public 
speech about the good life and the good society is already to surrender a 
major dimension of the human good. It will also have the further effect of 
undermining the concrete conditions necessary for a life of freedom. As 
Benjamin Barber has warned, "citizens so tame as to shrink from the con-
sequences of what they take to be public justice and common interest are 
scarcely citizens at all and are unlikely to be capable of defending freedom 
in any form." 20 Because intellectual solidarity is mutual engagement, the 
freedom it both presupposes and generates is not the freedom of being 
"left alone." Put positively, where conversation and argument about the 
good life begins and develops in intellectual solidarity, a community of 
freedom begins to exist. And this is itself a major part of the common 
good. Indeed it is this freedom in reciprocal dialogue that is one of the 
characteristics that distinguishes a community of solidarity from one 
marked by domination and repression. 
This solidarity in commitment to the common good also has social 
dimensions. It directly influences the way we understand what justice 
means in the social-economic realm. 
An adequate discussion of the full meaning of justice is impossible 
here. The task can be simplified, however, by noting the United States 
Catholic Bishops' 1986 description of the bottom-line demands of justice. 
They said "Basic justice demands the establishment of minimum levels of 
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participation in the Life of the human community for aLL persons." Put nega-
tively, "The ultimate injustice is for a person or group co be treated 
actively or abandoned passively as if they were nonmembers of the human 
race."" The U.S. Bishops call this exclusion "marginalization"-exclusion 
from social life and from participation in the common good of the human 
community. 
Unjust exclusion can cake many forms. Most relevant to the United 
States today is exclusion from the booming economic life of the country. 
There are so few decent jobs in most urban ghettos that many people sim-
ply give up looking for work. This amounts to the institutionalization of 
despair. When human beings are told repeatedly that they are simply not 
needed, it cakes extraordinary self-confidence to keep trying. Such mes-
sages, built into class structures of American life today, lead to the drugs 
and violence of many American urban centers today. They are the source 
of what Corne! West has dared co call the "nihilism" found among far too 
many urban youth today. 
When citizens "tolerate" such conditions when remedial steps could 
be taken, injustice is being done and the common good undermined. One 
can hardly chink of a more effective way to deny people active participa-
tion in the economic life of society than to leave chem facing unemploy-
ment for years, even over generations. Similarly, when people face the 
extremes of poverty in a vastly rich society like ours, they are effectively 
cold they don't count as members of our community at all. Their good is 
not part of any commonwealth. The extent of their suffering shows how 
far we are from being a community at all. 22 The willingness of citizens co 
tolerate such conditions and even cake actions chat perpetuate chem shows 
how far we are from an effective commitment to the common good in 
chis nation. 
Against the background of this normative understanding of solidarity 
and the common good, the fear that we are on the brink of a cultural war 
that can be prevented by tolerance seems rather naive. We live in a dan-
gerously divided nation and world. If we are co begin the task of securing 
even minimal justice, we need to confront these divisions, not "tolerate" 
them. The poor and marginalized people in our societies are members of 
the human community and we have a duty to treat them as such. 
Tolerance, non-judgmentalism, and "couch potato politics" will not do so. 
Only a real commitment to the common good will-a good that must be 
there for us all if it is co be there for any of us. When we begin to take 
steps toward this shared good, we will be on a path marked out for us by 
the deepest traditions of Western and Christian thought. We will be on 
the path toward an American public life healed of some of its deepest 
wounds and on the way to a new realization of the good that is common. 
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